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Brantley: Explanatory Surplusage in an Indictment Is Not Subject to Amendme

CASE NOTES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Amendments to IndictmentsExplanatory Surplusage in an Indictment
is not Subject to Amendment
Burrell v. State,
526 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
Richard Burrell was convicted of robbery and assault with intent to

murder a police officer.

The indictment returned by the grand jury charged

that Burrell, "with malice aforethought," assaulted a police officer "by

shooting him with a gun."

After the presentation of the testimony had

begun the trial court deleted these allegations on motion by the State. On
appeal Burrell complained that the trial court erred in permitting the State to
amend the indictment in the cause after the trial had commenced. HeldReversed. Language in an indictment, although unnecessary to charge the
offense but which is descriptive or explanatory of the offense charged, is a
matter of substance in the indictment that must be proved as alleged, and

cannot be disregarded as surplusage.'
The right to be charged by a grand jury indictment is guaranteed in both
the United States' and Texas' Constitutions. 2 An indictment is one of two
ways by which the State may commence a criminal prosecution ;3 it is a
formal statement of a charge returned by a grand jury, 4 and is the only way
to initiate a felony prosecution. 5 At common law the indictment of a grand
jury could not be amended in any manner by the court as to form or
substance. 6 The reason for the strictness of the early rule was the severity
1. Burrell v. State, 526 S.W.2d 799, 803 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 10.
3. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 27.01 (1965),

which provides that "The
primary pleading in a criminal action on the part of the State is the indictment or
information." See Hewitt v. State, 25 Tex. 722, 726 (1860); Ex parte Cain, 86 Tex.
Crim. 509, 510-11, 217 S.W. 386, 387 (1920).
4. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 21.01 (1965) defines an indictment as "the
written statement of a grand jury accusing a person therein named of some act or
omission which, by law, is declared to be an offense." This is distinguished from an
information, which is "a written statement filed and presented in behalf of the State by
the district or county attorney, charging the defendant with an offense which may by
law be so prosecuted." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 21.20 (1965).
5. Melancon v. State, 367 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963).
6. Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 6 (1886). The proper practice at common law was
to grant process against the grand jury to come into court and amend it, because an
indictment altered by the court was not the indictment of a grand jury, and could not
support a conviction. Id. at 6-7. See generally 10 B.U.L. REV. 388 (1930).
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of the penalties attached to many minor crimes, and the humane tendencies
of the courts to resort to any defect in the indictments to shield convicted
7
persons from such harshness.
Texas enacted a statute in 1854 that modified the common law rule,8 and
in subsequent codifications expanded that original provision to allow amendments as to form, but not as to substance. 9 The early cases gave effect to
the statutory dichotomy between form and substance, 10 and that division has
12
been retained in subsequent codifications," including the present one.

Shortly after the passage of the statutes creating the division between
amendments as to form and those of substance, the courts encountered the

problem of classifying unnecessary allegations, and adopted the approach
13
that such surplus matters could be deleted without vitiating an indictment.
These precedents were soon followed, and the rule became settled in Texas
7. Roberson v. State, 362 P.2d 1115, 1117 (Okla. Crim. App. 1961); Ex parte
Williams, 106 P.2d 524, 525 (Okla. Crim. App. 1940). See generally 41 AM. JUR. 2d
Indictments and Informations § 172 (1968). No exceptions to this strict rule were
permitted, and the fact that the accused consented to the amendment, or that the words
stricken from the indictment were unnecessary to charge the offense was immaterial.
United States v. Norris, 281 U.S. 619, 622-23 (1930) (consent); Ford v. United States,
273 U.S. 593, 602 (1927) (surplusage). The states, however, have modified the
common law rule by statute. E.g., CAL, PENAL CODE § 1009 (West 1971); MicH. CoMP.
LAWS § 28.986 (1972); PA. R. CIM. P., tit. 19, § 220 (Purdon's 1975). These
statutes do not conflict with the United States Constitution because grand jury requirements in the fifth amendment are not binding on the states through he fourteenth
amendment. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (1964); Beck v. Washington, 369
U.S. 541, 545 (1962).
8. Tex. Laws 1854, ch. 49, § 67, at 69, 3 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1513
(1854), which provides that:
No indictment or other accusation shall be abated for any misnomer of the accused, but the court may, in case of misnomer appearing before or in the course of
trial, forthwith cause the indictment or accusation to be amended accord-to fact.
9. Tex. Code Crim. P. art. 508 (1856) provided that "[w]hen the exception to an
indictment or information, is sustained merely on account of form, the same shall be
amended, if decided to be defective, and the cause proceed upon such amended indictment or information." Subsequently, Tex. Code Crim. P. art. 587 (1895) restated the
rule as:
Any matter of form in an indictment or information may be amended at any time
before an announcement of ready for trial upon the merits by both parties, but
not afterward. No matter of substance can be amended.
10. E.g., Bosshard v. State, 25 Tex. 207, 210 (Supp. 1860); Prior v. State, 4 Tex.
383, 385 (1849).
11. Tex. Code Crim. P. arts. 532, 533 (1925).
12. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.10 (1965), which contains the precise
wording of Tex. Code Crim. P. art. 587 (1895).
13. Sublett v. State, 9 Tex. 53, 55 (1852) (allegation of the type of card game
played); Wilson v. State, 5 Tex. 21, 22 (1849) (ownership of house where gambling took
place); Prior v. State, 4 Tex. 383, 385 (1849) (ownership). These cases explicitly
rejected the theory that where a person or thing necessary to be mentioned in an
indictment is described with unnecessary particularity, all the circumstances of the
description must be proved.
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that surplus allegations in an indictment may be disregarded and need not be
proved, 1 4 although the reason for this was never made entirely clear. 1'
The Texas courts, however, soon encountered situations in which the
surplus allegations were too closely related to the offense to be disregarded,
and enunciated an exception to the general rule of deletion. This exception
provided that where a person or thing necessary to be mentioned in an
indictment is described with unnecessary particularity, all of the circumstances of the description must be proved. 16 In subsequent cases, the
exception frequently has been stated in combination with the general rule, to
the effect that unnecessary words in an indictment may be disregarded as
surplusage when not descriptive of what is legally essential to the charge. 17
This exception has remained the law in Texas.' 8
The thrust of the general rule of surplus allegations, when coupled with
the exception, created a nebulous area in the law concerning the propriety of
amending indictments by the trial court. The trial court must determine
whether a particular surplus allegation is "descriptive" or "not descriptive" of
the offense charged, in order to decide if an amendment to the indictment
modifying or deleting such allegations is proper.
In dealing with this problem the Texas courts have followed a tripartite
procedure in testing the validity of an indictment and its amendments. These
correspond to the division of the indictment into substantive portions, formal
portions, and surplus portions. In the first phase of this process, the court
must determine whether or not the indictment alleges the constituent elements of the offense, and every fact or circumstance necessary to a complete
description of the offense. Unless the indictment contains the substantive
averments necessary to charge the offense alleged, it cannot support a
conviction.' 9 Once it is determined that the indictment contains the necessary elements to charge the offense, the trial court must ascertain whether
14. Cohen v. State, 479 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Mayo v. State, 7
Tex. Crim. 342, 346 (1879). See generelly 1 BRANCH's ANN. PENAL CODE § 517, at 497
(2d ed. 1974).
15. In Prior v. State, 4 Tex. 383, 385 (1849) the court intimated that as long as the
"most material" aspects of the charge are present the purpose of the indictment would be
achieved.
16. Hill v. State, 41 Tex. 253, 258 (1874); accord, Courtney v. State, 3 Tex. Crim.
257, 261 (1877); Warrington v. State, 1 Tex. Crim. 168, 187 (1876).
17. Moore v. State, 505 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Collins v. State,
500 S.W.2d 168, 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Malazzo v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 441,
443, 308 S.W.2d 29, 31 (1957).
18. E.g., Cohen v. State, 479 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); McClure v.
State, 163 Tex. Crim. 650, 653, 296 S.W.2d 263, 264 (1956); Simpson v. State, 10 Tex.
Crim. 681, 683 (1881); Lancaster v. State, 9 Tex. Crim. 393, 395 (1880); McGee v.
State, 4 Tex. Crim. 625, 626 (1878).
19. See Schepps v. State, 432 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); Northern v.
State, 150 Tex. Crim. 511, 203 S.W.2d 206 (1947).
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the indictment, as returned by the grand jury, meets all formal requisites. 20
Where the indictment does not comply with these requirements, the trial
court may allow an amendment prior to the announcement of ready for trial
by the parties. 2 ' After determining that the indictment satisfies all substantive and formal requirements, the court will then consider any surplus
allegations in the indictment. The mere presence of such allegations will not
invalidate -the indictment, 22 since these averments may be disregarded under
the general rule of surplusage unless they are descriptive of the offense
charged. 23 Allegations which are descriptive must be classified as part of
the substantive portion of the indictment; they cannot be disregarded as
24
surplusage, and they may not be amended.

It is in this hazy area of descriptive surplusage that the principal case has

application.

Burrell v. State25 postulates an expanded test for determining

whether or not a particular allegation is descriptive. Instead of merely
characterizing the words in the indictment as descriptive, the court went
further and held that where the surplusage is descriptive or explanatory of
the offense it may not be amended.2 6 The court based this extension on a

review of the prior cases, which indicated that the word "descriptive" had
been used synonymously with "explanatory. ' 27 Despite this reference by
the court to prior decisions, the earlier cases do not delineate any characteristics of "descriptive" surplusage. The prior decisions merely conclude that
the questionable phrase in each particular case is or is not descriptive,
without enumerating the identifying traits of descriptive words in general. 28
20. The basic requirements of an indictment are found in TEx. CODE GRIM. PROc.
ANN. art. 21.02 (1965), and a sample form of an indictment is outlined in article 21.16

of the Code.
21. Roberts v. State, 489 S.W.2d 113, 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); TEX. CODE
CIuM. PRoC. ANN. art. 28.10 (1965).
22. State v. Smith, 24 Tex. 285, 287 (1859); Agan v. State, 130 Tex. Crim. 162,
163, 93 S.W.2d 419 (1936); Sheffield v. State, 99 Tex. Crim. 95, 98, 268 S.W. 162, 164
(1924).
23. Moore v. State, 505 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Collins v. State,
500 S.W.2d 168, 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Malazzo v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 441,
443, 308 S.W.2d 29, 31 (1957).
24. Cohen v. State, 479 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); McClure v. State,
163 Tex. Crim. 650, 296 S.W.2d 263, 264 (1957); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
28.10 (1965).
See generally Comment, Indictments-Texas Rule o1 Surplusage, 13
TEXAS L. REv. 489 (1935).
25. 526 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
26. Id. at 803.
27. Id. at 803.
28. E.g., Brunson v. State, 152 Tex. Crim. 158, 211 S.W.2d 755 (1948) (allegations
in prosecution for driving while intoxicated, as to make, model, and year of car);

Arbetter v. State, 79 Tex. Crim. 487, 186 S.W. 769 (1916) (particularly describing the
means used to commit the offense); McAllister v. State, 55 Tex. Crim. 264, 116 S.W.
582 (1909) (allegation as to where the offense occurred); Loyd v. State, 22 Tex. Crim.
646, 3 S.W. 670 (1887) (coloration of a stolen animal). All of the above held the
allegations were descriptive. Other cases have held allegations not descriptive. See
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The court in Burrell attempts to avoid the terseness of the prior decisions by
elaborating on the meaning of "descriptive." This attempt at clarification,
while laudatory, consisted of only two findings: first, that the word "descriptive" was not limited to situations in which the surplusage serves as an
adjective, 29 and second, that the word "descriptive" had been previously
used synonymously with "explanatory. ' 30 The court concluded its analysis
at that point, and held that the words in Burrell were "descriptive and
31
explanatory" of the offense and could not be amended.
,It is clear from a close reading of Burrell, however, that the court did not
merely hold that "descriptive" could be used synonymously with "explanatory."'3 2 The court referred to the words "descriptive" and "explanatory" in
the alternative. 3 3 Had the court believed that the words were synonymous,
there would have been no need to conclude that the averments in the
indictment in the case at bar were "descriptive and explanatory. '34 By
using the words alternatively, the court suggests that each has an independent significance and are, in fact, not synonymous.
To determine the basis for this construction one must look to the reasoning
behind the rules concerning indictments. The purpose of an indictment is to
inform the defendant of the charge against him so that he may adequately
prepare his defense. 35 It is readily apparent that if the State were allowed
to continually alter the character and particulars of the offense, the defendant could not prepare an adequate defense. The desire to prevent such
prejudice to the defendant's right to defend himself accounts for the rule
requiring proof of unnecessary statements in an indictment, that are descriptive of the offense. The difficulty with this rationale is not that it is
incorrect, but rather that it is myopic in its assumption that an absolute
prohibition is the only way to achieve the purpose of the rule. Certainly
such a prohibition protects the defendant's rights, but the results of this in the
area of substantive surplusage are, at times, anomalous.3 6
Hicks v. State, 493 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (allegation as to date of
indictment); Handley v. State, 480 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (averments as to
the possession of non-contraband items by the defendant); Germany v. State, 154 Tex.
Crim. 454, 227 S.W.2d 815 (1950) (street address of hotel where offense occurred).
29. Burrell v. State, 526 S.W.2d 799, 803 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
30. Id. at 803.
31. Id. at 804.
32. Id. at 803, where the court stated, "[tlaking then the law governing the exception
that any matter descriptive or explanatory of that which is legally essential to constitute
the offense cannot be treated as surplusage .
(emphasis added).
33. Id. at 803.
34. Id. at 804.
35. Essary v. State, 53 Tex. Crim. 596, 111 S.W. 927 (1908).
36. See Poston v. State, 58 Tex. Crim. 583, 126 S.W. 1148 (1910), where it was
held that in an indictment charging theft of a sack of walnuts, the word "walnuts" was
descriptive, and proof that the sack in fact contained mixed nuts would not support a
conviction.
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This rationale seems to be a result of the statutory prohibition of
amendments as to substance which has been a part of Texas criminal
procedure for many years.3 7 The decisions in this area expressly or
impliedly rely on the statutory prohibition, 38 and that prohibition rests on
the implicit assumption that an absolute prohibition is the only way to
protect a defendant's rights.
Before the validity of the assumption may be questioned and alternative
measures suggested, however, a problem arises in those states which have
constitutionally guaranteed the right to be charged by grand jury indictment. 39 In these states, which include Texas, 40 the courts must contend
with the constitutionality of amendments to grand jury indictments. These
state courts have been unable to obtain reliable guidance from the federal
courts' construction of a similar provision in the Federal Constitution, 4 1 and
forced to resolve the problem alone, have formulated two responses to the
constitutional question. The first, and most traditional response, is exemplified by the Massachusetts approach. The Massachusetts Constitution contains a provision which guarantees the right to be charged by grand jury
indictment. 42 The Massachusetts Supreme Court has construed this clause
as prohibiting amendments to the substantive portions of indictments. 43
In Oklahoma, however, a different result was reached with regard to
amendments of informations. 44 The Oklahoma Legislature enacted a statute authorizing amendments of informations, as to either form or substance,
37. Tex. Code. Crim. P. art. 587 (1895).

38. Clopton v. State, 408 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) (implied); McDonald
v. State, 138 Tex. Crim. 610, 137 S.W.2d 1046 (1940) (express).
39. MASS. CONST. art. XII; OKLA. CONST. art. II, §§ 17, 18, 20.
40. TEx. CONST. art. I, § 10.

41. The United States Supreme Court adopted the strict common law approach in
Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1886), which has never been overruled. See Stirone v.
United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960); United States v. Cirami, 510 F.2d 69, 72 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 1952, 44 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1975); Overstreet v.
United States, 321 F.2d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 919 (1964);
Dodge v. United States, 258 F. 300, 305 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 660 (1919).
The "no amendment" rule has been weakened by several cases allowing amendments.
Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962) (amendments allowed as to form); United
States v. Colasurdo, 453 F.2d 585, 591 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917 (1972)
(amendment as to form); Thomas v. United States, 398 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1967)
(form); Dye v. Sacks, 279 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1960) (misnomer); Stillman v. United
States, 177 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1949) (typographical error). Surplus allegations,
descriptive of the offense, were held to be substantive and not subject to amendment in
United States v. Root, 366 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967).
See generally 1 C. WRIGrr, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CRIMINAL § 127, at 271
(1969).
42. MASS. CONST. art. XII.
43. Commonwealth v. Snow, 169 N.E. 542 (Mass. 1930).
44. An information is a formal accusation of a crime, differing from an indictment
only in that it is proferred by a prosecuting officer instead of a grand jury. People v.
Gahagan, 14 N.E.2d 838, 839 (Ill. 1938).
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prior to pleading without leave of court, and after pleading with leave of
46
court. 45 This statute was declared unconstitutional in an early case
because of a conflict with the Oklahoma Constitution. 47 Later cases,
however, reasoned that an amendment of substance does not necessarily
conflict with the constitutional guarantee, since the original information could
have been sufficient to inform the defendant of the nature of the act with
48
which he is charged.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Burrell, however, was faced with
an amended indictment, not an amended information. This distinction does
not render the analogy to the Oklahoma approach inapposite. The difference between the offenses charged by an indictment and an information in
Texas and Oklahoma is more illusory than real. In Texas a felony may not
be prosecuted by an information. 49 Oklahoma, however, allows felonies to
be prosecuted by either an indictment or information. 50 It seems clear that
Oklahoma would sanction amendments to informations charging offenses
that would require a grand jury indictment in Texas. In such cases,
Oklahoma would allow an amendment to the substance of an information if
it could be done without materially prejudicing the rights of the defendant,5 whereas the current Texas approach would prohibit any amendment to
the substance of an indictment charging the defendant with an identical
felony. The blurring of the distinction between indictments and informations in Oklahoma at least indicates that the rights of the defendant may be
secured by a constitutional and statutory scheme, allowing amendments to
the substantive portions of indictments. Unfortunately, matters of substance
in an indictment or information cannot be amended in Texas by reason of a
52
statutory prohibition.
The reasoning behind such a prohibition, and cases like Burrell that must
classify surplus allegations as either descriptive or not descriptive, is at least
open to question. The underlying rationale for the necessity of such a
classification is the traditional view that only an absolute prohibition against
amendments to the substantive portions of indictments will secure the
45. 22 OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 304 (1969).
46. Webb v. State, 224 P. 991, 992 (Okla. Crim. App. 1924).
47. OKLA. CONsT. art. II, §§ 17, 18, 20.

48. Herren v. State, 115 P.2d 258, 264 (Okla. Crim. App. 1941); Hill v. State, 287
P. 1080, 1082 (Okla. Crim. App. 1930). See generally 13 OKLA. L. REv. 438 (1960).
49. Melancon v. State, 367 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963); see King v.
State, 473 S.W.2d 43, 47-48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). See generally 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations § 9 (1944).

50. OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 17; 22 OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 301 (1969). In Hampton v.
Oklahoma, 368 F.2d 9, 10 (10th Cir. 1966) it was held that the defendant's constitutional rights were not violated because he was proceeded against by the use of an information rather than by an indictment.
51. 22 OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 304 (1969).
52. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.10 (1965).
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defendant's right to know the charge and prepare a defense. As the
Oklahoma approach has made clear, the controlling issue is avoiding prejudice to the defendant, which may be achieved by allowing the defendant
ample time, after an amendment, to prepare his defense.
Even if the decision in Burrell had been compelled by reasons other than
the statutory provisions and prior cases based on the unsound assumption
underlying those decisions, the conclusion of the court does not dispose of the
problem presented by unnecessarily descriptive indictments. The court in
Burrell has merely concluded that words "descriptive or explanatory" of the
offense are not subject to amendment.5 3
The crux of -the problem, unresolved in Burrell, is to define what is "explanatory" and what is "descriptive." Decisions in this area would 'be more
predictable with a clear delineation of the characteristics of "descriptive" and
"explanatory" surplusage. Since it is apparent that the court used the words
alternatively, 54 each word must have a significance independent of the other;
yet the particular words in Burrell were both descriptive and explanatory,
which suggests a certain similarity in meaning. The only conclusion which may
be drawn is that the terms "descriptive" and "explanatory" are not mutually
exclusive concepts but instead, are closely related and overlapping. Thus it
appears from Burrell that a surplus allegation may be descriptive but not
explanatory, explanatory but not descriptive, or simultaneously descriptive
and explanatory. 55
,By viewing the surplusage in this manner, a certain order can be found in
prior decisions. By determining the relation of the surplus allegation to the
charge, the character of that phrase as descriptive, explanatory, or both, is
established. Clearly, words used as adjectives to modify the offense are
descriptive. This is equivalent to saying that words are descriptive if they
refer to the "what" or the "where" of the offense, 50 or if they refer to the
physical characteristics of the items involved in the offense.57 In such cases,
the surplusage bears the same relation to the offense as an adjective does to
a noun. Burrell concludes, however, that substantive surplusage is not
limited to situations where the averments as adjectives modify the offense. 58
The prior cases, therefore, must encompass situations in which the averments
are explanatory. Thus explanatory surplusage refers to situations in which
53. Burrell v. State, 526 S.W.2d 799, 803 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).

54.
55.
56.
Withers

Id. at 803.
Id. at 804.
Snelling v. State, 57 Tex. Crim. 416, 417, 123 S.W. 610, 611 (1909) (what);
v. State, 21 Tex. Crim. 210, 212, 17 S.W. 725, 726 (1886) (where).

57. E.g., Holloway v. State, 168 Tex. Grim. 264, 265, 324 S.W.2d 886 (1959)

(means used); Arbetter v. State, 79 Tex. Crim. 487, 488, 186 S.W. 769 (1916) (means
used); Maxwell v. State, 66 Tex. Crim. 258, 145 S.W. 1190 (1912) (means used); Loyd

v. State, 22 Tex. Crim. 646, 3 S.W. 670 (1887) (physical characteristics).
58. Burrell v. State, 526 S.W.2d 799, 803 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
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the surplusage is not used adjectively, but is still held to be substantive. A
review of the cases suggests that this situation occurs where the indictment
contains surplusage referring to the method or manner of the offense. 59
Where a particular phrase contains both elements of description and explanation, as in Burrell, the two concepts overlap.
'By its decision in Burrell the court does not clearly develop the distinction
between descriptive and explanatory surplus. Indeed, the major difficulty
with this case is its lack of guidelines for future cases. Broadly stated, the
court should define substantive surplusage as any allegation so closely
connected or intimately related to the elements of the offense that when they
are placed in an indictment with those elements they become, by logical
inference, a part of the offense charged. This would encompass both
descriptive and explanatory averments. The court could then distinguish
these two types of substantive surplusage within the generic classification, if
that is deemed desirable.
A clear definition of what is descriptive is a first step to an unobstructed
view of the problems of amending indictments. A second step would be to
focus attention on the reason for the classification of surplusage as descriptive or not descriptive. It is suggested that by doing so, it will become
apparent that an absolute prohibition against amendments to the substance
of the indictment is not required to secure the rights of a defendant. A
statute allowing such amendments where they do not prejudice a defendant's
right to be made aware of the charge against him would serve equally as
well, and would avoid the anomalous results of -the present rule. The
reasoning of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals regarding informations suggests that such a statute could be construed in harmony with the
Texas Constitution.
John R. Brantley
59. Id. at 801 (manner of offense); Johnson v. State, 384 S.W.2d 885, 886 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1964) (means and manner of offense).
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